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Case No. 20090146-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Luis CRISTOBAL,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his conviction for criminal mischief, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2) (c) (West 2004), as enhanced to a second degree
felony pursuant to the group criminal activity enhancement provision, Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(2) (West 2004).1 This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Was the evidence sufficient to support enhancement to a second degree
felony pursuant to the group criminal activity enhancement provision?

1

Defendant does not challenge his underlying criminal mischief
conviction, nor does he challenge his convictions for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-2301 (West 2004), and criminal trespass, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a) (West Supp. 2006).

Standard of Review. "In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed
verdict based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, '[the appellate court]
will uphold the trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [it] conclude [s] that some
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the
crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt/ " State v. Montoya, 2004 UT
5 , 1 29, 84 P.3d 1183 (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,1225 (Utah 1989)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
The following provisions are reproduced in Addendum A: Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-106 (West 2004); and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count of criminal
mischief, enhanced to a second degree felony pursuant to the group criminal
activity enhancement provision; one count of driving without a valid driver's
license, a class B misdemeanor; three counts of contributing to the delinquency
of a minor, all class B misdemeanors; and one count of criminal trespass, a class
B misdemeanor.

R.4-3; R.189:40,158.

Following a preliminary hearing,

Defendant was bound over to stand trial on all charges but driving without a
license, which was dismissed. R.188:32-33.
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At trial, only the criminal mischief charge and gang enhancement was
submitted to the jury. See R.109-05. Defendant pled guilty to criminal trespass
and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor; the State dismissed
the remaining two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. R.10905. At the close of the State's case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on
the enhancement charge, but his motion was denied. R.189:134-37. The jury
later found Defendant guilty of criminal mischief, with the aid or
encouragement of two or more persons. R.103.
Before sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment on the
enhancement charge. R.114, 124-15. The trial court denied the motion and
sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate prison term of one-to-fifteen years.
R.136-28,139,145. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R.153-52,159-58.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the early morning hours of June 22, 2008, Joshua Eldridge was
working patrol as a security officer for Centurion Security. R.189:49-52. At
approximately 1:00 a.m., he drove by the Savers thrift store in Orem, but found
no unusual activity. R.189:56,59-60. When he returned about two hours later,
he saw a car with its headlights off parked next to a Savers' delivery truck.
R.189:52-54. A male stood next to the car, speaking with two young girls sitting
inside the car —later determined to be 12- and 13-years old. R.189:53-54,60-
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61,85,92-94. The male fled down the street when Eldridge turned on his
spotlight and approached the car. R.189:53-54,60-61.
Before exiting his car, Eldridge saw gang-related graffiti all over the
Savers building, which had not been there during his first patrol of the area.
R.189:56-57.

When Eldridge approached the car on foot, he saw in his

peripheral vision another male, with two spray paint cans in hand, run behind a
storage shed next to the Savers building. R.189:54-55,61-62. Eldridge then
walked toward the storage unit, but before reaching it, noticed that someone
had approached him from behind. R.189:55. Startled, Eldridge drew his baton
and turned around to find Defendant and 16-year-old Juan, the male who had
fled behind the storage shed. R.189:55-56,62-63,66,70,85,95-97; SE18.2 Eldridge
handcuffed the two men, sat them on the ground next to the Savers building,
and notified police. R.189:56,59,63-64,70,126,132. Officers arrived shortly after.
R.189:59,69.
In addition to the Savers building, a Savers delivery truck parked behind
the building, a dumpster, and a portable storage shed had also been tagged with
gang-related, blue and silver graffiti. R.189:56,73-75. "Provo PVL x 3" and
"PVL" had been sprayed on the building in blue and silver. R.189:74; SE1; SE2.

2

Because Juan was a juvenile at the time of the offense, the State will refer
only to his first name.
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"PVL x 3," "RJC" crossed out, and a profanity had been sprayed in blue on the
delivery truck. R.189:75; SE3; SE4. "Loco" had been sprayed in silver on the
dumpster. R.189:75; SE5. And "STG" had been sprayed in silver on the portable
storage shed. R.189:75,130-31; SE6.
Police later discovered that Defendant had PVL tatooed on his stomach
and Juan had "STG" written on his hand. R.189:78-79,130-31. When police
arrived on the scene, the smell of spray paint was still present and the paint was
still wet. R.189:57,82,127. Two spray paint cans were found behind the storage
shed — one silver and one blue. R.189:58,65-66. Police found a blue spray paint
cap on the passenger floorboard of the car in which the two girls were sitting.
R.189:82-83,129-30; SE11. They also found a silver spray paint cap on the
ground near the car. R.189:83,130; SE12. Defendant's hands were smeared with
silver paint. R.189:57,76-78,87; SE7-10. Paint was also smeared on Juan's hands.
R.189:57,87.
Defendant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with police.
R.189:70-72. He told police that Juan had driven him and the two girls to the
location just moments before Eldridge arrived. R.189:72. He said that they had
stopped when they heard someone yell out, "RJC," a rival gang of the PVL
gang. R.189:72,89-90,152-53. He claimed that just after they exited the car,
Eldridge spotted them. R.189:72. He denied spraying the graffiti, claiming that
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it was already there when they arrived. R.189:72,78. When asked about the
silver paint on his hands, Defendant claimed that it came from spray painting a
bat that was in the trunk of the car. R.189:79. Officers later found two bats in
the trunk. R.189:79-81,129. One had been spray painted, but it was blue.
R.189:80. Although Defendant claimed that he had left the PVL gang, he
admitted that they intended to use the bats to rough up any RJC gang members
they encountered. R.189:78,80.3
By the time of trial, a maintenance worker had covered the graffiti on the
building with primer and paint at a cost of approximately $150. However, he
had not yet finished the painting to match the rest of the building and estimated
that it would cost the business between $500 and $1,000 to complete.
R.189:102,105-08. The profanity on the delivery truck had been painted over,
but a professional paint job had not yet been completed. R.189:113. Savers
received a bid of $5,145.20 to repaint the truck. R.189:114-15; SE15.

3

At trial, Defendant continued to deny that either he or Juan spray
painted the graffiti. See R.189:138-51. He admitted to having been affiliated
with the PVL gang, but claimed that he had left them. R.189:147. He claimed
that when the foursome arrived, five people fled. R.189:140. He stated that he
thought his friend was among them, although he believed the others to be rival
RJC gang members. R.189:140-41,147-48,150. He also claimed that when he
was handcuffed, he put his hands up against the Savers wall. R.189:142.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury
finding that he committed criminal mischief in concert with two or more
persons. He concedes that the evidence was sufficient to establish that he
committed the offense in concert with one person—Juan. He claims, however,
that it was insufficient to establish that he committed the offense in concert with
an additional person.
Contrary to Defendant's claim, the evidence was sufficient to establish
that the unidentified male aided or encouraged in the commission of the crime.
He was present at the scene. Unlike the two girls, he was not simply sitting in
the car, but was standing outside the car. Next to the car was a silver spray
paint cap — the same color used to spray some of the graffiti. When the security
officer approached him, the unidentified male immediately fled, suggesting
consciousness of guilt. Moreover, Defendant himself claimed that the graffiti
had already been sprayed onto the walls when he and Juan arrived. The jury
may well have accepted that claim in part.

They may have reasonably

concluded that the parties had arranged to spray graffiti at the Savers location,
that the unidentified male had begun the job, and that Defendant and Juan were
now completing the job. The unidentified male's immediate flight from the
scene upon Eldridge's approach supports such a finding.
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ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A JURY
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT ACTED IN CONCERT WITH
TWO OR MORE PERSONS
At the close of the State's evidence, Defendant moved for a directed
verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a group criminal
activity enhancement.

R.189:134-36.

The trial court denied the motion,

concluding that the evidence of Juan's direct involvement in tagging graffiti,
together with the other male's immediate flight from the scene, was sufficient to
show encouragement by two other persons.

R.189:136-37.4

Defendant

challenges that ruling on appeal. See Aplt. Brf. at 12-22.
***

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court
reviews the evidence "in the light most favorable to the jury verdict convicting
him." State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120,121 (Utah App. 1998), cert denied, 982 P.2d
88 (Utah 1999). The Court "'will uphold the trial court's decision if, upon
reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it,
[it] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could
find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable

4

Defendant also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence after his
conviction in a motion to arrest judgment, which was also denied. R.114,124-15,
139-38.
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doubt/" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ^ 29,84 P.3d 1183 {, ., : nig State v. Dibello,
780 P.2d 1 221 1 225 ( Utah 1989)).
To prevail on a group criminal activity enhancement charge, the State is
required to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] acted in
concert with two or more persons." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(l)(a) (West
2004). The evidence, therefore, must support a jury finding that the defendant
"was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the
offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged, and each of the
other persons . . . was physically present" or "participated as a party" to the
offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(l)(b).
Defendant concedes that the evidence in this case was sufficient tc>
establish that Juan aided in committing the offense of criminal mischief. Aplt.
Brf. at 16, 21. He argues, however, that the evidence was insufficient to show
that a second person aided or encouraged in the commission of the offense.
Aplt. Brf. at 16-22. Contrary to Defendant's claim, the evidence was sufficient to
establish that the unidentified male who fled the scene aided or encouraged in
the commission of the offense.
It is true that"' [m]ere presence, or even knowledge, does not make one an
accomplice when he neither advises, instigates, encourages, or assists in
perpetration of the crime/ " Labrum, 959 P.2d at 124 (quoting State v. Kerekes, 622
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P.2d 1161,1166 (Utah 1980)). The evidence of the unidentified man's complicity,
however, was more than his mere presence —it included his flight from the
scene as soon as Eldridge approached.
The law has long been settled that "[f]light... immediately following the
commission of a crime [is an] elementf ] which may be considered as evidence of
implication in that crime/' State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596, 236 P.2d 1077,1079
(1951). Admittedly, "a defendant's flight from a crime scene, standing alone,
'does not support an inference of intentional conduct.'" State v. Holgate, 2000 UT
74, K 23, 10 P.3d 346 (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 790 (Utah 1991)).
However, "the circumstances of a defendant's flight, in addition to other
circumstantial evidence, may be adequate to support such an inference." Id.
Such was the case here.
Unlike the two girls, the unidentified male was standing outside the car in
which Defendant and Juan had traveled to the scene. R.189:53-54, 60-61. Also
next to the car was a silver spray paint cap — the color of some of the graffiti.
R.189:83,130; SE12. In addition, Defendant claimed that graffiti had already
been sprayed on the walls when he and Juan arrived. R.189:72,78. The jury may
have reasonably believed this statement in part, concluding that the parties had
agreed to meet there to spray the graffiti, that the unidentified male had already
begun the graffiti, and that Defendant and Juan were completing the job. The
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unidentified male's immediate flight from the scene supported that injti once,
or, at the very least, the inference that the unidentified male was operating as a
lookout. Indeed, at trial, Defendant himself acknowledged that he and Juan and
arrived at the scene to meet a friend. R.189:140-41.5
In sum, it is undisputed that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury
finding that Juan aided Defendant in the commission of the offense. Moreover,
the circumstances of Defendant's flight, together with the other circumstantial
evidence, was adequate to support a jury finding that the unidentified male also
aided or encouraged the commission of the offense. The evidence was thus
sufficient to support the group criminal activity enhancement.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the enhancement.
Respectfully submitted January 25, 2010.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

JEFFREY S. GRAY

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

5

The State concedes that because the only evidence of the girls' complicity
was their presence at the scene, the evidence was insufficient to establish that
they aided or encouraged in the commission of the offense.
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ADDENDUM A

Utah Code A n 11 k iMvh»ti(lu

t 1\\[\\)

(1) As used in this section, "critical infrastructure" includes:
(a) information and communication systems;
(b) financial and banking systems;
(c) transportation systems;
(d) any public utility service, including the power, energy, and water
supply systems;
(e) sewage and water treatment systems;
(f) health care facilities as listed in Section 26-21-2, and emergency fire,
medical, and law enforcement response systems;
(g) public health facilities and systems;
(h) food distribution systems; and
(i) other government operations and services.
(2) A person commits criminal mischief if the person:
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys
property with the intention of defrauding an insurer;
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another and
as a result:
(i) recklessly endangers:
(A) human life; or
(B) human health or safety; or
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or
impairment of any critical infrastructure;
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another; or
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or
against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or
caboose, whether moving or standing.
(3) (a)(i) A violation of Subsection (2) (a) is a third degree felony.
(ii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(A) is a class A misdemeanor.
(iii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(B) is a class B misdemeanor.
(iv) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is a second degree felony,
(b) Any other violation of this section is a:
(i) second degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to
cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value;
(ii) third degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to
cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000
in value;

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (West 2004)

(iii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to
cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $300 but is less than $1,000 in
value; and
(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to
cause pecuniary loss less than $300 in value.
(4) In determining the value of damages under this section, or for computer
crimes under Section 76-6-703, the value of any item, computer, computer
network, computer property, computer services, software, or data includes the
measurable value of the loss of use of the items and the measurable cost to
replace or restore the items.
(5) In addition to any other penalty authorized by law, a court shall order
any person convicted of any violation of this section to reimburse any federal,
state, or local unit of government, or any private business, organization,
individual, or entity for all expenses incurred in responding to a violation of
Subsection (2)(b)(ii), unless the court states on the record the reasons why the
reimbursement would be inappropriate.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-106; Laws 1992, c. 14, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 11, eff. May 1,1995; Laws 1996, c.
142, § 1, eff. April 29,1996; Laws 1997, c. 300, § 1, eff. May 5,1997; Laws 1998, c. 25, § 1, eff. May 4,1998;
Laws 1999, c. 31, § 1, eff. May 3,1999; Laws 2002, c. 166, § 6, eff. May 6, 2002.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (West 2004)

Utah Code \nn. $ 76-^201 ) (U i*st .?(I(M|
(l)(a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is subject to
an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection (3) if the trier of
fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person acted in concert with two or
more persons.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the
defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in
committing the offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged,
and each of the other persons:
(i) was physically present; or
(ii) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4).
(c) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b)(ii):
(i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to
engage in the same offense or degree of offense as the defendant; and
(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a
party if he were an adult.
(2) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall
cause to be subscribed upon the information or indictment notice that the
defendant is subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section.
(3) The enhanced penalty for a:
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony;
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony;
(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and
(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not less than nine
years and which may be for life.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding
drug-related offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 6, Part 2;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West 2004)

(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4;
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 76-6503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-6512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520;
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Title 76,
Chapter 8, Part 3, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 76-8308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in
Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses under
Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering and
Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002.
(5) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that
the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not
identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are
charged
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
"O
v

Laws 1990, c. 207, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 12, § 108; Laws 1999, c. 11, § 1, eff. May 3,1999; Laws 2000, c. 214, § 2,
eff. March 14, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 209, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West 2004)

